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2ABSTRACT
This paper is concerned with three questions:  (a) how would a stockmarket help economic and
industrial development in a country like China; (b) will a stockmarket be system-compatible; and (c)
if a full-fledged stockmarket is indeed introduced in a socialist economy, can its “negative
influences” (speculation, booms and crashes) be minimized? These issues are examined
analytically with the help of empirical evidence of stockmarket behavior in advanced and newly
industrializing economies. Although the paper considers the specific case of China, the
argument is more general and has application to other developing as well as centrally planned
economies.
RESUMEN
Este artículo plantea tres preguntas: (a) cómo podría contribuir un mercado de valores al
desarrollo económico e industrial de un país como China; (b) sería compatible con el sistema un
mercado de valores; y (c) si se introduce un mercado de valores completamente desarrollado en
una economía socialista, ¿pueden reducirse sus “influencias negativas” (especulación, auges y
crisis)?  Se examina estas cuestiones de manera analítica con base en la evidencia empírica sobre
el comportamiento del mercado de valores en las economías avanzadas y las de industrialización
reciente.  Aunque este artículo analiza el caso específico de China, el argumento es de carácter
más general y podría aplicarse a otras clases de economías en desarrollo tanto si como a aquellas
con planificación centralizada.
3I.  INTRODUCTION
The General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, Zhao Zi Yang, in his report to the
Party’s Thirteenth National Congress observed as follows in relation to “restructuring” the
Chinese economy:
The reform we have already carried out includes the development of different
types of ownership, public ownership remaining predominant, and even allows
the private sector to exist and develop.  This reform is determined by the actual
condition of the productive forces in the primary state of socialism, and it is the
only way to promote their development.  Some of the things we have introduced
in the process of reform, such as expanded markets for means of production,
funds, technology, and labour service, and the issuance of stocks and bonds, are
phenomena which are not peculiar to capitalism but are bound to appear in the
wake of large-scale, socialized production and the development of the
commodity economy.  Socialism can and should make use of them, trying at the
same time to minimize their negative effects in practice.1
The main purpose of this paper is to consider the usefulness of the institution of the
stockmarket in the present circumstances of the Chinese economy.  Specifically, the following
questions are raised by such an investigation:
1.  How if at all will a stockmarket help the “development of productive forces,” i.e.,
economic and industrial development in China?
2.  Will a stockmarket be system-compatible, i.e. conform to socialist values, even
those of “socialism with Chinese characteristics”?2
3.  If a full-fledged stockmarket is indeed introduced, can its evident “negative
influences” (speculation, stockmarket booms and crashes) be minimized?
In recent years, China has established embryonic stockmarkets in Shanghai, Beijing, and
other large cities, with limited trading in company shares.  Professor Li Yining of Beijing University,
a leading exponent of economic reform in China, told the New York Times last December that “By
1995 virtually every state-owned corporation will have issued shares that will be publicly traded on
exchanges around the country.”  Mr. Li believes that the government should retain control of at
least 25% of most companies but that the remaining 75% or less of the shares should be freely
traded.  He is reported as saying “There is no turning back.  We have no other way to go.”  More
significantly, in the same despatch, General Secretary Zhao Zi Y ng, is quoted as telling an
audience, “The shareholding system will be carried out step by step.”3
                                                
1  Zhao 1988.
2  The title of General Secretary’s Zhao’s report is “Advance along the Road of Socialism with
Chinese Characteristics.”
3  New York Times, 5 December, 1988.
4Although there is evidence of a slowdown in the pace of reform this year in the face of
China’s economic difficulties, the questions outlined above will continue to be important.
Moreover, the significance of these issues extends beyond China since many other socialist
countries are also presently experimenting with share ownership and stockmarket institutions,
e.g. Hungary and Yugoslavia.4
II.  THE FUNCTIONS OF A STOCKMARKET IN A CAPITALIST ECONOMY
A natural starting point for a discussion of the desirability of establishing a stockmarket in a
socialist economy is to ask what functions does the stockmarket perform in a capitalist society
where such markets have long been in existence.  Following Hughes and Singh (1987) we note
that, in theory, the stock exchange has a triple role:  first, to pool together society’s savings
dispersed among individual savers; second, to selectively channel these savings to companies
with the best investment prospects; and third, to encourage the efficient use of assets
embodying past savings.  Two interrelated mechanisms are involved:  a primary market
mechanism whereby new issues of shares are made by companies wishing to raise funds; and a
secondary market mechanism whereby trade in existing shares of companies is carried out.  A
company whose equities are traded at a relatively low price will find it more expensive or even
impossible to raise new funds in the primary market.  It may also be subject to the threat of a
takeover in which a majority stake in its equity is acquired by another company whose objective is
to change policies to improve the stock price.  Management teams may thus complete in a market
for corporate control, and takeovers on the stockmarket may then be interpreted as an essential
part of the competitive selection process in a capitalist economy.
A central question is how well, in fact, are these supposed functions actually performed
by the real-world stockmarkets?  There is a voluminous literature on these issues but for the
purpose of the analysis of this paper the essential points may be summarized as follows.  As far as
the savings function is concerned, the stockmarket, it turns out, makes at best a very limited
contribution to social savings.  For a number of reasons, managers in large corporations avoid
going to the stockmarket to raise funds by means of issues of stocks and shares (Baumol 1968;
Singh 1971; Stiglitz 1985).  In a recent paper, Mayer (1988) used flow of funds accounts to show
that between 1970 and 1985, in the two leading stockmarket economies, the UK and the US,
new issues made a negative contribution (i.e., there were net receptions of shares due to
takeovers) to net investment in the nonfinancial corporate sector.  In these two countries the
nonfinancial corporations financed most of their net investment from retentions (in the case of the
UK, more than 100%).
                                                
4  For Yugoslavia see, for example, Uvalic 1988;  for Hungary see, for example, Nuti 1988.
5The investment in large corporations in capitalist countries is thus carried out
overwhelmingly through retained profits or through borrowings from banks.  Moreover, there is
evidence that the retained earnings are not as profitably utilized as they might be:  the rate of
return on ploughed-back profits tends to be considerably less than on new issues or debt
(Baumol, Heim, Malkiel, and Quandt 1971; Whittington 1972).
Crucial to the allocative and the disciplinary function of the stockmarket is the efficiency of
the pricing process.  Only if the trading activity on the stockmarket is such as to yield relative share
prices of firms that more or less correspond to their relative expected profitability will the market be
at all able to effectively carry out these tasks—rewarding the profitable enterprises by making
funds to expand available to them cheaply and punishing the unprofitable companies by making
them decline or disappear.5
There are many studies purporting to show that stockmarket prices are “efficient” in the
sense, for instance, of rapidly incorporating new information (Keane 1983).  There is not much,
however, to suggest that share price movements are systematically related to the current, past, or
subsequent underlying performance variables of companies, or to longer run equilibrium
considerations rather than those of short-run equilibrium (Nerlove 1968; Little and Rayner 1966;
Shiller 1979; Summers 1986).  It is the influence of “short termism”6 and of speculators on the
stockmarket that led Keynes to observe in the Gen ral Theory:  “Speculators may do no harm as
bubbles on a steady stream of enterprises.  But the position is serious when enterprise becomes
the bubble on a whirlpool of speculation.  When the capital development of a country becomes a
by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done.  The measure of success
attained by Wall Street, regarded as an institution of which the social purpose is to direct new
investment into the most profitable channels in terms of future yield, cannot be claimed as one of
the outstanding triumphs of laissez-faire capitalism...”
Although “efficient” prices in the sense outlined above are a necessary condition for the
stockmarket o perform its essential tasks, they are not sufficient. Sufficiency requires, in
addition, that the “takeover mechanism” be efficient so that all those companies whose
profitability under their existing managements was lower than it could be under any other
management were acquired by the latter. For large management controlled oligopolistic
corporations in capitalist economies, for which t e natural selection process on the product
markets may not work, the takeover mechanism is the only effective market-based disciplinary
                                                
5  In the normal calculus of a capitalist economy, private profitability is taken to be an indicator of
“efficiency.”  There are well-known reasons why private and social valuations and private and
social costs may differ even in a perfectly competitive equilibrium market economy.
6  The term refers to the short-term time horizon of many important players on the
stockmarket—for example fund managers of financial institutions whose own performance as
managers is judged by short-term results.  See Cosh, Hughes, Lee, and Singh 1989.
6device.7  However, modern theorists of the firm and economic organization have argued in recent
contributions that for a number of powerful reasons even in principle the takeover device may not
work effectively even when the prices are “efficient.”8
More significantly, empirical studies of the actual nature of the takeover selection process
on the stockmarket show that in general it is not the case that only the unprofitable companies are
taken over, nor that the greater the profitability of the stockmarket valuation of a company, the
correspondingly lower its chances of acquisition.  Evidence from a wide range of studies for the
UK, the US, and other industrial countries indicates that the takeover selection takes place only to
a very limited degree on the basis of profitability; it does so much more in terms of the size of the
company.  A large, relatively unprofitable company has a much greater chance of being immune
from takeover than a much more profitable but small company. In fact, in the real-world
stockmarkets, making an acquisition to increase size might itself become a tactic to avoid takeover
(Greer 1986; Singh 1971).
If we turn from the question of what kinds of companies are taken over on the stockmarket
and by whom to that of what happens to resource use following takeover, the empirical evidence
is no more reassuring.  In addition to their disciplinary role, takeovers also provide an important
mechanism in a capitalist economy for the reorganization of the capital resources of the society in
response to changing technology tastes and market conditions. However a wide range of
empirical studies comparing pre- and post-merger profitability indicate that on average the
profitability of merging firms does not improve after merger.  To the extent that the monopoly
power of the acquiring company in the product market may increase as a consequence of
takeover, this evidence is compatible with reduced efficiency in resource utilization following
mergers.9
Finally, in relation to the actual behavior of stockmarkets and their impact on economic
development in the capitalist countries, it is useful to note that until recently the stockmarket has
played a major role only in the US and the UK economies.  It has historically been much less
important in countries like West Germany, France, Japan, or Italy.  In these non-Anglo-Saxon
industrial economies, until the 1980s a comparatively small number of companies was listed on
the stockmarkets.  Trading was relatively thin as the share ownership was not as widely dispersed
as in the US and the UK.  In West Germany, for example, the banks have played a much bigger
role in savings, in the allocation of capital, and in the disciplining of firms than the stockmarket
(Cable 1985).  It is significant that the overall economic performance of the stockmarket dominant
                                                
7  See further Singh 1971, 1975; Meade 1968; Alchian and Kessel 1962; Manne 1965.  Because
of the so-called principle/agent problems in the large management controlled corporations,
shareholders dispersed throughout society may not be able to get the managers to act in the
shareholders’ interests rather than in the managers’ own self-interest.
8  See for example Grossman and Hart 1980; Stiglitz 1985.
9  For systematic evidence on this subject for a number of industrial countries, see Mueller 1980.
7economies of the US and the UK over the last 40 years has been much poorer than that of the
non-stockmarket economies.  It is indeed true that during the 1980s the financial markets were
being liberalized in most advanced countries, including the non-Anglo-Saxon ones.  However,
the impetus for such liberalization in countries like Japan and West Germany comes more from the
current imbalances in the world economy and from US political pressure than from the exigencies
of economic development.10  There is reason to believe that the “forces of production” in the
hitherto non-stockmarket economies are more likely to be harmed than helped by the
globalization and liberalization of financial markets that is presently taking place.11
III.  STOCKMARKETS AND SHARE OWNERSHIP IN SOCIALIST ECONOMIES
In the textbook theories of socialist economics, the allocation of investment has usually
been regarded as one area where socialism has a clear advantage over market economies.  There
are several reasons for this view which are well known in the literature.12  Briefly, first, as Scitovsky
(1954) pointed out a long time ago, in the absence of complete futures markets, market prices in a
capitalist economy do not provide necessary information for the ex ante coordination of
investment plans of firms.  This serious deficiency of market economics can then only be
remedied by the government planning of investment resources.  Secondly, the planners can in
principle allocate social capital on the basis of social needs rather than private profitability which
may not always coincide with such needs.  Thirdly, the government can ensure full utilization of
resources which the market economy, left to itself, may not necessarily be able to achieve—the
usual Keynesian argument.  In view of these considerations, even in the Lange-Lerner economy
of market socialism and decentralized profit maximization by the managers of individual firms, the
control of investment decisions was envisaged to be vested in a government planning agency.
However, as opposed to this idealized picture, the actual experience of “realized
socialism” has been rather different.13  Total investment has often turned out to be “excessive,”
contributing to Kornai’s “shortage economy” syndrome in socialist countries.  There are well-
known investment cycles, and at the microeconomic level there are myriad examples of inefficient
utilization immobility and misallocation of resources.  For these and other reasons several planned
economies in Eastern Europe as well as China have embarked on an economic reform
programme, which essentially involves marketization and managerial autonomy.  The process of
reform has normally been piecemeal and protracted, leading at each step to difficulties whose
resolution in the eyes of the reformers requires further reform.
                                                
10  For a fuller analysis of this issue, see Cosh, Hughes, and Singh 1989.
11  Ibid.
12  For one of the earlier analyses of these issues, see Dobb 1939.
13  See, for example, Kornai 1980; Bauer 1978; Nuti 1988a.
8Thus in China, following the death of Mao, first the agricultural sector was liberalized by
the abandonment of people’s communes.  Next, the reformers turned to the urban economy and
over time a large number of commodities has been taken out of the hands of the central planners
for their prices to be determined “freely” by market forces (Naughton 1986).  At the same time,
several steps were taken to provide greater managerial and enterprise autonomy.  In 1984, the
government published a list of ten principles which were intended to greatly increase the ability of
managers in state-owned enterprises14 to make their own production, marketing, and pricing
decisions (Griffin 1986).  Managers were also given more discretion to determine the internal
organization of the firm, to choose their management eams, to recruit workers. The state
enterprises were also permitted to dispose of or rent unneeded fixed capital assets (provided the
capitalized value of the enterprise remained the same) and to retain 70% of the depreciation
funds.
Following the classic dynamic of reform, these changes in turn have lead to calls for a
review of the question of ownership and that of property rights.  Two important arguments are
made in this respect.  First it is suggested that the present position where in principle a state
enterprise is “owned by the whole people” is too abstract and does not provide the proper
incentives for managers and workers to make best use of the enterprise’s resources.  Secondly, it
is argued that “managerial autonomy” can only be properly ensured by a change in property
rights—by selling shares in state-owned enterprises to specific institutions (e.g. banks, provincial
or local governments) or private individuals.  Thus Gu and Liu (1988) observe:  “the noteworthy
problem is that when the property rights remain ambiguous, the redistribution of benefits is not
able to make the enterprise have long-term aims and truly form a self-restricting and self-
promoting managerial mechanism.  Therefore the reform aimed at radically improving the
enterprise’s managerial mechanism should start with the rationalization of the relations between
property rights and determination of property ownership.  This requires that the profits obtained
by the enterprise, after delivery to the state of the returns on state assets and taxes, should
belong to the enterprise and so should the reinvested amount of the retained profits and return
from them.  The enterprise, according to law, has the right to own, use, collect income from, and
dispose this part of assets.”  They go on to claim: “we can thus see that the introduction of the
system of shares into state-owned enterprises is not simply a subjective choice, but represents
an objective demand by China’s economic life after the reform and constitutes the basic chain of
change in the enterprise mode.”
                                                
14 There are over 60,000 state enterprises in China which account for about 75% of aggregate
industrial output.  Out of the total non-farm work force of 133.4 million in 1988, state-owned
enterprises employed 97.9 million workers, collectives 34.9 million, and private enterprises 0.8
million. See the Economist, 21 January 1989.
9Once shares have been issued, the next step in the line of reasoning of the reformers is
to suggest that there should be a market for these shares.  This is thought to have two significant
advantages.  1) It would make it possible to weed out inefficient management teams by market
rather than political processes.  2) The “missing” capital market will help in the efficient allocation of
resources without government interference.15
Turning from theoretical considerations to actual practice, the N w York Times estimates
that currently 7,000 to 10,000 Chinese companies have issued shares.  There are stockmarkets
in Shanghai, Beijing, and Shenyang and a few other provincial cities.  The biggest market appears
to be Shanghai where more than 350,000 people own shares issued by over 1,000 companies.
However, the shares issued are more in the nature of bonds than equities since they carry a fixed
interest and do not provide clear ownership rights.  Many of the shares are held by enterprise
employees and various government agencies.  Trading tends to be rather limited as few people
sell shares once they have purchased them.  However, it is reported that a group of financial
institutions is attempting to establish a national stock exchange modelled in part on the
exchanges in New York, Milan, and Tokyo.
For Hungary, Nuti (1988a) reports that there has been a bond market in operation since
1983.  There are both primary issues of bonds and secondary trading for enterprises (nonstate
guaranteed) as well as households (guaranteed).  Bond issues have increased overall thirtyfold
over a five-year period and purchases by households have increased a hundredfold.  It appears to
be the case that ordinary shares have also been issued by some state enterprises and are
retraded but until now exclusively among the enterprises themselves.
In Algeria, which until recently was run as a traditional centrally planned economy,
economic reform has taken a different approach to share ownership and enterprise management.
Following the government decree of January 1988, the state-owned enterprises were turned into
joint stock companies with shares owned by the state.  Eight independent holding companies
(not entirely specialized by sectors), the so-called fonds de participation, were set up to manage
these state enterprises.  Fund managers, whose performance is supposed to be judged by the
financial results of their portfolios, can alter their holdings by trading with each other.  The purpose
of the system is apparently to simulate the disciplinary and allocative functions of a stockmarket.16
To sum up, the above account suggests that although share ownership and
stockmarkets in China and other socialist countries are at present at a rudimentary stage, their
future role in these economies in the eyes of many of the reformers is potentially very important.
                                                
15  A number of different proposals concerning share ownership and trading in shares have been
made by Chinese reformers.  A notable recent contribution is that of Hua Sheng, Zhang Xuejun,
and Luo Xiaopleng.  Their views, first outlined in Eco omic Research, were given an airing in the
People’s Daily in January 1989.
16  See Nuti 1988a.
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IV.  THE STOCKMARKET AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA
In what ways and through what channels will the institution of stockmarkets promote the
“forces of production” in the Chinese economy?  The first crucial point to note here is that by
conventional macroeconomic criteria China has an exceptionally successful industrial economy.
As Table 1 indicates, the Chinese industrial growth rate during the period 1965-80 was quite
respectable by international standards, even though the first ten years of this period involved all
the upheavals of the Cultural Revolution which particularly affected industry.  China’s industrial
economy expanded at a faster rate during these fifteen years than that of most developing
countries including the highly successful Latin American giants, Brazil and Mexico.
In the 1980s China’s industrial record has been spectacular:  industry has developed at a
quicker rate in that country than almost anywhere else in the world.  Whereas the tempo of
industrialization in the Latin American countries such as Brazil and Mexico has succumbed to the
debt crisis and the slowdown in world economic growth during this decade, the Asian semi-
industrial countries have continued to expand.17  However, Chinese industrial growth in the
1980s has been even faster than that of South Korea.  Table 2 indicates that China’s overall
economic performance in the 1980s—at least in terms of GDP growth—has also been extremely
good.  (It was just creditable but not outstanding in the earlier period, mainly because of the
relatively much slower growth in agriculture.)
Nevertheless there are at present serious macroeconomic imbalances in the Chinese
economy and it is believed by the reformers that the development of the stockmarket will help to
correct such disequilibria.  The most important of these is reflected in the high rate of inflation that
China is currently experiencing.  Further, the rate of investment is thought to be too high and its
sectoral allocation is regarded as inappropriate.  In addition, the reformers point to a wide range of
microeconomic inefficiencies in the economy. We consider below the implications of the
establishment of a stockmarket for each of these areas.
                                                
17  For an analysis of the differential performances of Asian and Latin American industrial
economies in the 1980s, see Singh 1989.
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TABLE 1
Growth of Industrial Production and Share of Industry in GDP
Semi-Industrialized Countries:  1965-80, 1980-86
_______________________________________________________________________
Growth of Industrial Structures of Production
Production (% per annum) Share of Industry in GDP
1965-80 1980-86 1965 1985
China 10.0 12.5 38 46
India 4.0 7.1 22 29
Mexico 7.6 -0.1 31 39
Brazil 9.9 1.6 33 39
South Korea 16.5 10.2 25 42
_______________________________________________________________________
Developing Countries 7.2 4.6 31 36
Middle-Income Developing
   Countries 7.2 2.1 33 36
Low-Income Developing
   Countries 8.4 1.2 25 30
Industrial Countries 3.2 2.5 40 35
_______________________________________________________________________
Source:  World Development Report 1988.
_______________________________________________________________________
TABLE 2








South Korea 9.5 8.2
_______________________________________________________________________
Developing Countries 6.1 3.8
Middle-Income Developing
   Countries 6.6 2.3
Low-Income Developing
   Countries 6.5 1.8
Industrial Countries 3.6 2.5
_______________________________________________________________________
Source: World Development Report 1988.
_______________________________________________________________________
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1.  Inflation, Savings, Investment, and the Stockmarket
Table 3 indicates that China has long been a low-inflation country.  Until 1980, there was
hardly any recorded inflation at all.  However, with the progressive decentralization of the
economy, inflation began to accelerate in the 1980s and had reached, by Chinese standards,
very high levels by 1988.  The official rate of inflation was 7.8% in 1987 and 20.7% in 1988.18  In
the early months of 1989, inflation was reported as running at an annual rate of over
30%19—clearly a cause for immense concern for the Chinese people and the leadership.
_______________________________________________________________________
TABLE 3
Rates of Inflation in Asia and Latin America, 1963-1984
(average annual rates of growth of consumer price index, in percentages)
_______________________________________________________________________
Asia   1963-73  1973-79  1979-84
China -0.5a 0.6b 3.0
India 8.3 6.3 10.0
Indonesia 42.1c 19.7 12.5
Korea 13.2 17.9 12.1
Malaysia 2.1 6.2 6.0
Pakistan 5.1 14.8 9.2
Philippines 7.9 13.3 19.8
Sri Lanka 4.3 7.3 17.0
Taiwan 3.5 12.0 12.9d
Thailand 3.2 9.7 8.3
_______________________________________________________________________
Median 4.7 12.0 10.0
_____________________________________________________________
Latin America
Argentina n.a. 181.5 222.8
Bolivia 8.2 17.4 195.6
Brazil 31.4 38.6 121.6
Chile n.a. 167.9 22.1
Colombia 11.2 23.7 22.8
Ecuador 5.9 14.5 23.6
Mexico 4.5 19.8 53.7
Peru 9.9 38.2 82.8
Venezuela 2.2 8.9 13.0
_______________________________________________________________________
Median 8.2 23.7 53.7
_____________________________________________________________
n.a. = not available
a 1965-70. c 1966-73.
b 1970-79. d 1979-82.
Source:  World Bank Data Bank.
_______________________________________________________________________
                                                
18  IMF Survey, May 1, 1989.
19  Economist, 25 February 1989.
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It is argued by the reformers that the creation of a proper stockmarket will help reduce
inflation by promoting savings.  This argument, however, is not convincing for at least three
reasons.  Firstly, as Table 4 suggests, China already has one of the highest rates of domestic
savings in the world.  At 36% of GDP in 1986, it was considerably higher than that of the various
groups of developing countries as well as of the Third World as a whole.  It was also greater than
that of South Korea.  Nevertheless, to the extent that it is suggested that domestic savings in
China should increase still further, higher real interest rates on bank deposits and/or, better still,
extension of modern banking to rural China are likely to be better ways of achieving this objective
than the attractions of an equities market which may be subject to considerable volatility.20 The
banking system or the financial institutions could also introduce some additional more flexible
instruments of savings deposits as indeed some banks have already been doing in recent years.
_______________________________________________________________________
TABLE 4
Gross Domestic Investment and Gross Domestic Savings as Percentage of GDP:
Semi-Industrial Countries, 1965 and 1986
_______________________________________________________________________
Investment Domestic Savings
1965 (%) 1986 (%) 1965 (%) 1986 (%)
_______________________________________________________________________
China 25 39 25 36
India 18 23 16 21
Brazil 20 21 22 24
Mexico 22 21 21 27
South Korea 15 29 8 35
_______________________________________________________________________
Developing Countries 15 29 20 24
Middle-Income
    Developing Countries 21 23 21 24
Low-Income
    Developing Countries 17 19 16 17
Industrial Countries 23 21 23 21
_______________________________________________________________________
Source:  World Development Report 1988.
_______________________________________________________________________
Thirdly, the important point is that inflation is a macroeconomic phenomenon, caused by
too high a level of aggregate demand.  This is in part due to a very high level of investment.
(Gross domestic investment as a proportion of GDP was 10 percentage points greater in China in
                                                
20  On the question of volatility, see below.  To the extent that it is argued that Chinese
households are not rise averse but prefer risk the state can indulge such tastes by running
lotteries, as indeed many socialist countries already do.  A straightforward state-run lottery is better
than gambling on the equities market with real enterprises.
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1986 than in South Korea—see Table 4).  This in turn arises from the growing loss of central
control over investment decisions of enterprises since the beginning of the economic reform
(Naughton 1986).  Other significant causes of inflation include decentralized bonus payments to
employees by individual enterprises and the consequent breakdown of what effectively until the
late 1970s had been a strict incomes policy (Singh 1979; Griffin 1986).  At a deeper level, the
inflationary problems arise from the fact that although the overall rate of Chinese economic growth
has been very high, there is no longer any social consensus on the distribution of income, thus
leading to conflicting claims over the national product.  However, the essential point is that the
reasons and remedies for inflation lie in the macroeconomic sphere and the institution of the
stockmarket is unlikely to help in this respect; on the contrary, it could make matters worse.  The
Chinese government has been reluctant to use macroeconomic stabilization measures because
of the fear of causing “stagflation” in the economy.  Without such macroeconomic stabilization, a
likely stockmarket boom under inflationary conditions would make control over prices more rather
than less difficult.
2.  Sectoral Allocation of Investment
The question of the overall level of investment has been discussed above.  As far as the
allocation of investment is concerned, there are two broad issues:  (i) the allocation of investment
among the broad sectors of the economy; (ii) its allocation among enterprises within a sector or
industry.  We shall briefly consider (i) here; (ii) will be examined in IV.3 below.
At the end of the 1970s, the Chinese government identified many important structural
imbalances in the economy, e.g. a too high and ever increasing share of industry in the GDP and
too low a share of services; the sluggish growth of agriculture; within industry, an excessive share
of heavy industry in the industrial product (World Bank 1985).  Since 1980, many of these
imbalances have been greatly reduced to the clear benefit of the standard of living of the Chinese
people.  There has been a huge improvement in both the quantity and the quality of available
consumer goods.  A number of new products, e.g. color televisions and VCRs, have been
introduced.  Urban housing has vastly improved.  However, as Riskin (1988) rightly points out,
many of these changes have been brought about by the macroeconomic actions of the central
planners (rather than through “reform” as normally understood), for example, through allocating
greater investment resources to the consumer goods industry, to housing, etc.  In Chinese
institutions’ circumstances, it is difficult to see that a stockmarket would have been able to bring
about such enormous changes in the broad sectoral investment allocation more quickly or more
effectively than the country’s central planning mechanism.
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3.  Microeconomic Efficiency and Intrasectoral Investment Allocation
At a microeconomic level, Chinese industrial enterprises are thought by the reformers to
have a number of serious weaknesses:
(a) As a consequence of the soft budget constraint in the socialist countries,
there exists a considerable degree of x-inefficiency in Chinese firms.
(b) Managers in state-owned enterprises—“owned by the whole people”—do
not have appropriate performance incentives.  This contributes significantly
to x-inefficiency.
(c) There is inefficient allocation of intraindustry investment resources since
there is underutilization of capacity in some enterprises whilst there is
overutilization in others.  Resources do not flow from enterprises that are
using them less efficiently to those that are, or could, utilize them more
effectively.
(d) There is no clear-cut arm’s length mechanism for changing inefficient
management teams.  At best this is done through political processes rather
than on the objective basis of the quality of enterprise management.
A central question is whether share ownership and the institution of the stockmarket are
the only or the best way of solving these problems. With respect to these issues, several
observations are in order.  Consider (a) the question of x-inefficiency.  First, as noted earlier,
notwithstanding all the essentially a priori concerns as well as casual evidence about x-inefficiency
in Chinese industrial enterprises, it must be stressed that China’s overall industrial growth rate has
been extremely high, among the highest in the world.  Secondly, to the extent it is argued—quite
correctly—that if x-inefficiency were reduced overall industrial growth would be higher still, this
goal is likely to be better achieved through competition in the product markets rather than through
the disciplinary mechanisms of the capital market.  As seen in Section II, even in advanced
capitalist economies with highly organized capital markets, the stockmarket is a poor disciplinarian
of large management controlled corporations.
Turning to (b), the question of managerial incentives in state-owned Chinese enterprises,
it is important to reflect that share ownership and the stockmarket are by no means the only ways
of inducing optimal managerial performance.  The growing literature on “privatization” of state-
owned enterprises in the advanced as well as the developing countries is relevant here.  Kay and
Matthew (1988) have noted on the basis of their comparison of state-owned and privatized
enterprises in the UK that “privatization” is neither a necessary nor  sufficient condition for
improving enterprise performance.  Rather, they suggest that the promotion of product market
competition is a greater spur to microeconomic efficiency than the transfer of ownership.
Similarly, the experience of POSCO, the giant Korean state-owned steel company, is instructive.
POSCO is by far the most successful steel producer in the world, even more successful than the
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Japanese steel companies.  Aylen (1987) notes that its success is due to its being set clear-cut
goals, given managerial autonomy, and being subject to market competition. Managerial
autonomy is clearly not ruled out by state ownership.
It is also important to bear in mind that profit sharing can be, and indeed, is used as an
incentive for workers and managers in tate-owned enterprises in many countries, including
China, without either share ownership or a stockmarket.  Moreover, if it is felt that employees
would have an even greater incentive to perform better if they had in addition an ownership stake
in the enterprise, they could be issued shares without there being a stockmarket in these shares.
In fact, this particular incentive can work best only if the workers are obliged to retain their stake in
the firm and not to sell it.
Let us now examine (c), the issue of interfirm allocation and mobility of capital.  Would it be
best facilitated by the stockmarket or by other mechanisms?  The first important point to note in
this connection is the normal volatility of stockmarket prices.  In the wake of the stockmarket crash
of October 1987 in New York, London, and elsewhere, there has been an important debate on
the question whether, as a consequence of liberalization of the world stockmarkets and
introduction of new devices such as programme trading in recent years, the markets have
become more volatile than before.  Although the evidence from the Brady Commission
(appointed in the US to investigate the 1987 crash) and other sources suggests that the volatility
has not increased compared, say, with the 1930s,21 the fact remains that the share prices on the
stockmarkets are normally highly volatile.  It is useful to reflect here on the recent behavior of
some Third World stockmarkets.  Between 1982 and 1985 share prices on the Brazilian
stockmarket rose fivefold in US dollars terms; two years later they had dwindled to 28% of their
1985 value.  In 1988 the market had risen again by 40%.  In Taiwan the stockmarket more than
quadrupled from the beginning of 1987 to mid-1988 before crashing; it is still slightly less than
40% of its 1988 all-time high.22
In the light of such volatility of share prices, interfirm allocation of investment resources
through the stockmarket would not appear to be a very sensible course.  Indeed in a different but
related context, Williamson (1970) regarded such volatility and other imperfections of the
stockmarket as an important reason why a so-called M-Form corporate organization will perform
better than a U-Form organization.  The “central office” of the M-Form organization, acting as a
“surrogate” capital market, can provide a superior mechanism for allocating investment resources
to the different subsidiaries relative to the real-world stockmarkets.  The practical implication of this
view for China’s industrial management is that instead of establishing actual stockmarkets, they
should attempt to create surrogate markets for intraindustry resource allocation.  One method of
                                                
21  See Cosh, Hughes, and Singh 1989.
22  See the Economist, April 29, 1989.
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doing this would be to establish state-owned holding companies and entrust them with the overall
management of groups of industrial enterprises—much like an M-Form organization.  These
holding companies should be allowed to compete with each other and their managerial
performance should be judged by their financial results.
With respect to (d), the related question of the change of inefficient managements
through the market rather than political processes, the experience of the stockmarket economies
of the US and the UK with the takeover mechanism is far from being a happy one.  For many of the
reasons discussed in Section II, an increasing number of scholars regard involuntary takeovers as
a costly, inefficient, and cumbersome mechanism for forcing a change in corporate management.
There are often huge transactions costs (particularly if the takeover bid is defended) and
enormous speculation in shares, and at the end of the day it is far from clear whether the
management that actually succeeds in a takeover battle is in fact better at long-term industrial
management rather than being simply more adept at short-term financial manipulation.  These
considerations have led to calls, both in the US and the UK, for separating the market for shares
from that of corporate control.23 It is suggested that it would be better for management changes to
occur through active participation by financial institutions (who now hold the bulk of corporate
shares in the Anglo-Saxon countries) in corporate affairs than by the takeover process.  It is
interesting to note in this regard that in countries like Japan there are hardly any “involuntary”
takeovers on the stockmarket.  In the light of the experience of the advanced countries, it would
not seem sensible for a developing country like China to adopt such a costly and uncertain
system of enforcing management changes in industrial enterprises.
V. CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis suggests that as far as the promotion of “forces of production” is
concerned, the institution of the stockmarket in the present circumstances of China’s economy is
unlikely to make a positive contribution.  In the inflationary conditions that have prevailed in the
country in recent years, a stockmarket could in fact have a negative influence on economic and
industrial development by contributing to overall instability.  This paper suggests that the
“negative features” of the capitalist institutions which General Secretary Zhao referred to in his
speech at the 13th Congress (see Section I) are best overcome in the case of the stockmarket by
not having an actual stockmarket but rather by simulating its functions via the establishment of
new financial institutions.  These would in effect be competing holding companies of industrial
enterprises.  The holding companies would have managerial autonomy and their performance
                                                
23  See a recent Bank of England discussion paper, Charkham 1989.  In the US, a number of
individual states have adopted laws to restrict involuntary takeovers.
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would be judged by financial results.  Further, it is argued here that at the present stage of China's
development, to increase microeconomic efficiency, the reformers should pay greater attention
to the promotion of competition in the product markets.
The question of the system-compatibility of the stockmarket with socialism has not been
given specific attention in the above discussion.  This is mainly because “socialism with Chinese
characteristics” seems to be rather catholic in its embrace.  The “primary stage of socialism” and
the development of “the commodity economy” appear to be compatible with almost all institutions
of a market, i.e. capitalist, economy.  Unlike in the Mao era, the main focus of the post-Mao
Chinese leadership is clearly not socialism as such but the development of the “forces of
production,” or more specifically the “four modernizations” adumbrated by Deng Xiaoping a
decade ago.  Perhaps that is as it should be, but in any case it is the standpoint adopted in this
paper in relation to the question of the usefulness of the institution of the stockmarket in the
present conditions of the Chinese economy. The question of system-compatibility of the
stockmarket remains, however, an important one in a country like Yugoslavia where there has
been a serious discussion of the extent to which the workings of the stockmarket would conflict
with socialist values and institutions, particularly with labour managed firms.24
                                                
24  For a recent survey of this discussion, see Uvalic 1988.
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